



The world is gearing up for a final Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meeting in Geneva, where nations will aim to agree on a legally binding text to combat plastic pollution, including in the marine environment. Significant progress has been made between the first and the second part of the fifth INC meeting. The Chair has been successful in building the momentum needed to arrive at a decision in Geneva.

The pressing questions, however, remain. Will the final text be robust, actionable and financially strong to lead us to a world free from plastic pollution?



# GLOBAL PLASTIC TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

## COUNTRY POSITIONS



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A briefing document for the second part of the fifth session of INC to end plastic pollution, Geneva, 2025



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Geneva, 2025

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## Introduction

Plastic pollution gained global attention as the issue of marine litter emerged as a critical concern and was taken up as a priority by the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA). As the principal global forum for addressing urgent environmental challenges, UNEA played a key role in bringing clarity and focus to the complexities of the plastic pollution crisis. Member states collectively recognized that marine litter and microplastics are symptoms of deeper systemic issues, namely, the unsustainable production and consumption of plastics. Addressing these challenges requires a life-cycle approach. In March 2022, UNEA adopted Resolution 5/14, committing to develop an international legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution across the entire life cycle of plastics, including its impacts on the marine environment.

The resolution also called for the establishment of an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) comprising representatives from all member states. Since its inception, the INC has convened five times, with the mandate to develop an international legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution. Despite these efforts, however, consensus has remained elusive. The fifth session, originally intended to be the final negotiating round, was held in Busan, South Korea, but failed to deliver a finalized treaty text due to persistent disagreements among countries. As a result, a resumed session of the INC is scheduled to take place in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning on August 5, 2025.

### Profits over the planet and people!

Plastics are made from fossil fuels such as crude oil and gas. Reports from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) predict that the global oil and gas demand will peak towards the end of decade.<sup>1</sup> Oil-rich countries comprising the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) view things differently. The World Oil Outlook published by OPEC projects continued growth in oil demand up to 2050, driven by factors such as the use of petrochemicals.<sup>2</sup>

### Plastics are petrochemicals made from fossil fuels

Plastics account for the largest share of petrochemical production, with packaging being the largest consumer. Approximately 63 per cent of global petrochemical production, by weight, is used for the production of polymers (primarily plastics), according to international research group Zero Carbon Analytics.<sup>3</sup>

Oil-producing nations, including members of the Arab Group, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have faced criticism for negotiating in bad faith during treaty discussions. These countries have been accused of attempting to narrow the scope of Resolution 5/14 by focusing primarily on plastic waste management, rather than addressing the broader issue of plastic production. In contrast, countries that are disproportionately impacted by plastic pollution continue to advocate for a comprehensive life-cycle approach that addresses the full spectrum of the plastic problem, from production and use to final disposal.



# Assessment methodology

Ahead of the planned final round of negotiations, the Chair of INC, His Excellency Luis Vayas Valdivieso, released three successive versions of a ‘non-paper’ to guide the committee’s discussions. The third version was presented as the basis for negotiations. However, it was met with strong resistance from a like-minded group of countries, who insisted that the original, more extensive compilation text developed over the previous four INC sessions must remain accessible throughout the negotiations. Ultimately, the Chair agreed, and both the non-paper and the compilation text were allowed to be referenced during the fifth session of the INC.

While plenary meetings are open to a broad range of observers, including the media, discussions within contact groups are held under Chatham House Rule and cannot be attributed to specific member states. However, if a member state chooses to make its submission public by sharing it with the Secretariat, that content is no longer bound by Chatham House confidentiality and may be shared openly.

CSE has reviewed all the written in-session submissions made by member states to the Secretariat. Since the Secretariat has made these documents publicly available on the INC web page, this analysis does not violate the Chatham House Rule.

	No in-session submission
	Proposes ambitious additions to the text
	Proposes text that lowers ambition
	Agrees with the text (includes minor text changes)
	Opts for no text (meaning no article)

The document is structured into 22 sections, corresponding to the articles for which in-session submissions were made by member states. Each section captures the full range of written inputs submitted during the fifth session of the INC (see *Box: Articles analysed by CSE on the basis of on in-session submissions from member states*). The report presents a bird’s-eye view of the priorities of the countries as mentioned in the submissions.

**Please note:** To ensure ease of understanding, names of the articles listed in the box follow the Chairs text released on the December 1, 2024.

ARTICLES ANALYSED BY CSE ON THE BASIS OF ON IN-SESSION SUBMISSIONS FROM MEMBER STATES

- Preamble
- Scope
- Principles and Approaches
- Article 1: Objective
- Article 2: Definitions
- Article 3: Plastic products
- Article 5: Plastic product design
- Article 6: Supply
- Article 7: Releases and leakages
- Article 8: Plastic waste management
- Article 9: Existing plastic pollution
- Article 10: Just transition
- Article 11: Financial [resources and] mechanism
- Article 12: Capacity building, technical assistance and technology transfer, including international cooperation
- Article 13: Implementation and Compliance
- Article 14: National plans
- Article 15: Reporting
- Article 16: Effectiveness evaluation
- Article 17: Information exchange
- Article 18: Public information, awareness, education and research
- Article 19: Health
- Article 20: Conference of Parties

## Understanding country groupings in this analysis

In the context of the Global Plastic Treaty negotiations, countries typically participate through regional groupings designated by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). These include:

- African States
- Asia-Pacific States
- Eastern European States
- Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC)
- Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
- Western European and Other States (WEOG)

However, as the negotiations have progressed, it has become evident that countries are also aligning themselves with broader political or interest-based coalitions recognized under the wider UN system. These include groupings such as the European Union (EU), the Arab Group, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the Pacific SIDS (PSIDS).

This overlap in affiliations has created a degree of complexity. Many countries belong to more than one grouping—for example:

- Comoros is part of the African Group, Arab Group, and AOSIS.
- Fiji is part of the Asia-Pacific Group, AOSIS, and PSIDS.
- Mauritius appears under the African Group and AOSIS.
- Lebanon and Jordan are part of the Arab Group and Asia-Pacific.
- Suriname and Belize align with both GRULAC and AOSIS.

Importantly, most of these overlapping countries have not consistently clarified their alignment in the negotiating sessions. While some have made interventions on behalf of specific coalitions, many have remained silent on which group they are speaking for. This makes it difficult to assign countries definitively to one grouping when analyzing trends and positions.

For the purpose of this analysis, countries have been grouped based on their broader geographic regions and any publicly stated or observable affiliations during the treaty negotiations. Where a country has explicitly aligned itself with a specific coalition—through in-session statements or official submissions—that affiliation has been noted and reflected accordingly. For instance, when Egypt makes a submission on behalf of the Arab Group, it is counted as aligned with that group for that article. However, other Arab League members from Africa who have not explicitly done so are considered part of the African Group for this analysis.

In cases where countries belong to multiple groupings (e.g., AOSIS, PSIDS, Arab Group, etc.) but have not clearly indicated their affiliation during negotiations, they have been categorized based on their geographical vicinity and the pattern of their submissions and alignments observed during previous INC meetings.

This classification is intended solely for analytical purposes to interpret trends in country positions during the INC negotiations to end plastic pollution. It does not imply any formal political alignment or official affiliation beyond the context of observed negotiation behaviour.

The groupings for the purpose of this analysis are as follows:

#### **African Group of Nations (54)**

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-

Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

#### **AOSIS (39)**

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mauritius, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu

#### **PSIDS (14)**

Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu

#### **Arab Group (22)**

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

#### **EU (27)**

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden

#### **GRULAC (33)**

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

# PREAMBLE

The preamble sets the tone for the treaty and is generally well received across negotiating parties, reflecting shared recognition of the scale and urgency of addressing plastic pollution. It successfully captures the global nature of the problem and the need for coordinated international action. However, there remains room for refinement to align it more closely with the treaty's ambitious goals. During negotiations, numerous countries and regional blocs have offered targeted proposals to ensure the text captures both universal challenges and distinct national or regional realities.

There is a shared acknowledgment that addressing plastic pollution requires not only environmental responsibility but also equitable global support mechanisms. Several developing nations, including members of the African Group, have highlighted the need for fair access to financial resources, technology, and capacity-building. Their emphasis on sustainable consumption and production reflects a broader call for systemic change in global material flows.



Small Island Developing States (SIDS), represented by Samoa and Vanuatu, sought specific recognition of their vulnerability to plastic pollution due to geographical and ecological factors. Their interventions underscored the danger of lumping all developing countries into a single category, arguing instead for differentiated treatment based on distinct exposure and capacity constraints. Similarly, countries like Bangladesh and Indonesia called for attention to geographic nuances, such as riparian or archipelagic status, that shapes national plastic waste management challenges. China and Japan encouraged language that acknowledged the functional role of plastics in modern society, advocating for a circular economy approach rather than outright vilification. Meanwhile, countries like New Zealand and the United Kingdom pointed to the need for science-based decision-making and a holistic view that includes public health, ecosystem impacts, and policy coherence.

Divergent views persist, particularly around whether the treaty should reflect differentiated responsibilities or focus more uniformly on shared commitments.



Preamble

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option



# SCOPE

As negotiations on a global treaty to end plastic pollution continue, the issue of scope remains one of the most debated. Member states have expressed divergent views on how expansive or restrained the treaty's coverage should be, reflecting broader geopolitical alignments, national interests, and environmental philosophies.

A central point of reference for many is the mandate laid out in the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) Resolution 5/14. Countries such as the United States, along with allies including Switzerland, Australia, Norway, Monaco, Iceland, and New Zealand, emphasized that the resolution already provides a sufficiently clear framework.

The African Group of Nations, represented by Malawi and Ghana, advocated for a scope fully grounded in the UNEA resolution while emphasizing that it must address the entire plastic life cycle. Rwanda and South Africa echoed this view, urging a comprehensive approach that goes beyond final products to tackle leakage, environmental harm and socioeconomic impacts.


Several countries such as Iran, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation explicitly requested the exclusion of upstream components like hydrocarbons and polymers from the treaty's scope. These positions align with a broader bloc, including Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and China, which appears cautious about treaty provisions encroaching on industrial or energy sectors.

Others, like the Philippines and South Africa, support including the full life cycle of plastics, from design to disposal. Indonesia offered a nuanced stance, marking polymerization as the starting point while ruling out national security and emergency response as treaty concerns.

This debate illustrates the tension between calls for system-wide transformation and efforts to contain the treaty within politically palatable boundaries. As discussions progress, reconciling these divergent views will be essential to developing a treaty that is both actionable and widely acceptable.

Scope

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option





# PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES

The question of which guiding principles should shape the global plastics treaty has sparked significant deliberation among member states. While there is general agreement that a strong ethical and normative foundation is essential, countries differ markedly on which principles to emphasize and how they should be embedded within the treaty framework.

Many states, particularly from the Global South, have pushed for explicit references to foundational environmental and developmental principles, including those articulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration. The African Group, represented by Malawi and Ghana, advocated the inclusion of all 18 Rio principles, signalling a desire for a treaty rooted in historical precedent and global environmental governance norms.


Similarly, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), including both AOSIS and PSIDS, emphasized principles tailored to their vulnerabilities, such as recognition of special circumstances, the precautionary principle, and the polluter pays principle.

The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) emerged as a recurring theme, with support from a wide range of actors including Brazil, Egypt, India, South Africa and Indonesia. For these countries, CBDR affirms the need to consider varying capacities and historical responsibilities in implementing treaty obligations. Alongside it, principles such as sovereignty over natural resources, the right to development, and equity also featured prominently.

In contrast, the United States and several aligned countries, including Australia, Norway and Switzerland took a minimalist approach. They argued that a well-crafted preamble and operational text would be sufficient, negating the need for a dedicated section on principles. This reflects a broader concern among some developed countries about over-complicating the treaty with abstract or potentially contentious concepts.

Some states sought middle ground. The Philippines, for instance, expressed openness to referencing general principles without insisting on a standalone article.

Principles and approaches



# ARTICLE 1 OBJECTIVES

The objective of any treaty serves as its compass, defining the shared purpose that binds parties together. In the case of the global plastics treaty, Article 1 aims to establish a unifying mission: to end plastic pollution, including its impacts on the marine environment, while safeguarding human health and the broader ecosystem. This high-level articulation has received wide support, as it mirrors the language and structure found in previous multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).

Deliberations around Article 1 of the Global Plastics Treaty reveal both a broad consensus on the need to end plastic pollution and divergent perspectives on the framing and ambition of this objective. Most countries agree that the treaty should explicitly aim to protect human health and the environment, with many emphasizing the need for a comprehensive, full life-cycle approach to plastics.

Countries such as Ghana (on behalf of the African Group), Rwanda, Bangladesh and Tuvalu (on behalf of PSIDS) advocate for a clear and strong reference to addressing plastic pollution throughout its entire life cycle from production to disposal. They highlight the importance of tackling not only plastic waste, but also upstream drivers like production volumes and product design. These positions often reference marine environments and biodiversity, recognizing the global and transboundary nature of plastic pollution.

Brazil, Egypt and Indonesia also support the overarching goal of ending plastic pollution but tend to frame it within broader sustainable development or environmental protection narratives. Malaysia introduces circular economy considerations, suggesting that sustainable waste management and safer material cycles are integral to the treaty's success.

On the other hand, countries such as Iran, Kazakhstan and Kuwait call for greater sensitivity to national contexts. Iran emphasizes legacy plastic pollution and the need for financial and technical support for developing countries. Kuwait and others express caution about expanding the treaty's mandate too far, raising questions about overlap with other international health and environment frameworks.


Notably, there is variation in how specific or ambitious states wish the objective to be. Some seek quantifiable targets or mechanisms, while others prefer flexible formulations that allow national discretion.



# Article 1: Objectives

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS / PSIDS



# ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS

One of the most fundamental yet contentious aspects of the draft global plastics treaty lies in Article 2, which outlines key definitions. These definitions are critical, as they shape the scope, interpretation and enforceability of the treaty's provisions. However, not only have key terms been inconsistently treated across negotiation drafts, but deep divides remain among states on how central terms should be defined.

In earlier drafts, terms like microplastics, primary plastic polymers, and recycling featured prominently. Yet, these have been omitted in the most recent version, partly due to political sensitivities and differing national priorities. Even terms that remain such as plastic, plastic pollution and plastic waste are still the subject of contention. For instance, plastic is broadly described as a material composed wholly or partially of synthetic or semi-synthetic polymers, while plastic pollution is defined across the full life cycle. Still, these definitions remain open to interpretation and disagreement.


Countries like Norway have called for a clearer and more inclusive definition of microplastics and raised concerns about narrowing the definition of plastic pollution to end-of-life waste. This proposal received support from several other states, notably Bangladesh, the EU and the Philippines. In contrast, countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Iran have questioned the inclusion of such definitions without additional precision, such as size thresholds for microplastics or clearer language on emissions.

Looking ahead, a pragmatic approach would be to draw from existing international legal instruments to harmonize definitions. Additionally, terms should be contextually developed in tandem with article-specific discussions. Without agreed definitions, the treaty risks fragmented implementation, legal loopholes and diluted ambition undermining its global effectiveness.

# Article 2: Definitions

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS





# ARTICLE 3 PLASTIC PRODUCTS

Article 3 is among the most substantively ambitious provisions in the treaty but currently remains heavily bracketed, reflecting persistent disagreements on structure, scope and obligations. At its core, the article attempts to reconcile national flexibility with the need for global coherence in addressing high-risk plastic products and chemicals of concern. While many states endorse a hybrid approach combining nationally determined actions with binding global bans there is divergence on how each tier of action should be operationalized.

A large number of countries, including the EU, PSIDS and the UK (on behalf of a joint submission with Norway, Moldova and Peru), have advocated for global bans informed by clear, science-based criteria. These criteria would help determine which plastic products and chemicals pose unacceptable risks, meriting phaseout. Submissions have proposed that meeting any of the agreed criteria should be sufficient to warrant listing, with some variations such as Kenya and Russia insisting that all criteria must be met. This difference points to deeper debates around the precautionary principle versus evidentiary burden.

States such as Australia and the USA have proposed a two-track system, wherein certain products are regulated domestically and others through globally binding obligations. This structure is echoed in Switzerland's submission, which includes initial lists and supports public disclosure. However, concerns about trade disruptions and national capacities continue to shape counter-positions. Countries like Iran and Kazakhstan have pushed for voluntary frameworks and tailored national responses, cautioning against one-size-fits-all bans. Iran has also rejected references to chemicals of concern, instead favouring a risk-based, nationally defined approach.

Several states—including Brazil, Canada, and Thailand—have focused their submissions on managing chemicals in plastic products, proposing mechanisms for identification and eventual phase-out. The challenge lies in ensuring these mechanisms are enforceable and not merely aspirational.

Ultimately, while many agree on the urgency to restrict the most polluting plastics, disagreements over definitions, criteria and institutional responsibilities have stalled progress. Streamlining the text with clearer roles for national measures, supported by globally agreed lists and decision-making procedures, could enable a more effective and politically viable pathway forward.

# Article 3: Plastic products

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS

## United States of America

Submitted two separate proposals for plastic products and chemicals of concern. Suggested a range of measures (prohibit, reduce, restrict production, discourage government procurement, design improvement, promote research among others).

## United Kingdom

UK on behalf of Republic of Moldova, Norway and Peru: Proposed a criteria for identifying plastic products to be banned/phased out. Proposed an initial list for global bans/phase outs. Advocated for global bans on select plastic products.

## Norway

Joint submission with UK (on plastic products) and Switzerland (on chemicals of concern). Both submissions include a global criteria and an initial list.

## Hungary on behalf of EU

Proposed a criteria for identification of plastic products that should be considered for bans/phase outs. Mentioned that products should meet 'any of the criteria to be considered'. Supported global bans and public disclosure of data related to plastic products not listed.

## Switzerland

Proposed a criteria for identification of plastic products that should be considered for bans/phase outs. Mentioned that products should meet 'any of the criteria to be considered'.

## Ghana

Joint submission with Switzerland on chemicals of concern. Proposed a criteria and initial list of chemicals to be phased out

## Rwanda

Joint submission with Switzerland on chemicals of concern. Proposed a criteria and initial list of chemicals to be phased out

## Republic of Moldova

Joint submission with UK (on plastic products) and Switzerland (on chemicals of concern). Both submissions include a global criteria and an initial list.

## Türkiye

Inserted language on CBDR. Requested for a reasonable time-frame for the governing body to identify possible measures and best practices to develop guidelines. Advocated to 'refrain from any measure that creates unnecessary obstacles to international trade'.

## Georgia

Joint submission with Switzerland on chemicals of concern. Proposed a criteria and initial list of chemicals to be phased out

## Kazakhstan

Inserted voluntary language and advocated for 'adopting tailored approaches that reflect their specific contexts'. Suggested to 'regulate' rather than 'prohibit/ban/phase out'. Encouraged to adopt national measures to identify plastic products

## China

Advocated to 'strengthen the management of plastic products based on national circumstances and capabilities, and identify national priorities on plastic products that may cause pollution to take necessary measures'. Exhibited flexibility for adoption of global bans if a certain plastic product cannot be effectively controlled nationally and thus needs a global action. Included reference to criteria in its submission

## Russian Federation

Suggested 'Each Party should identify at the national level problematic plastic products based on national circumstances and capabilities.' Proposed that plastic product under consideration should meet 'all' criteria requirements rather than 'any'.

## Cook Islands on behalf of PSIDS

Aligned with the AOSIS submission. Inserted references to traditional/indigenous/local knowledge

## Peru

Joint submission with UK (on plastic products) and Switzerland (on chemicals of concern). Both submissions include a global criteria and an initial list.

## Canada

Joint submission with Switzerland on chemicals of concern. Proposed a criteria and initial list of chemicals to be phased out.

## Brazil

Proposed a mechanism for control measures regarding chemical additives of concern. Suggested such proposal must be made by at least two MS from different UN regions to be considered by the committee. Advocated for basic data, risk assessment and management data. Any chemical that makes it through the mechanism could be listed in an Annex for Global list of chemicals additives of concern.

## Iran

Advocated for improving waste management systems before considering global bans. Removed references to chemicals of concern from the criteria.

## Kenya

Proposed that plastic product under consideration should meet 'all' criteria requirements rather than 'any'. Advocated that the review committee develop an initial list along with justification. Disagreed to any party proposing for a plastic product to be included on a global list

## Thailand

Advocated for 'harmonizing the list of chemicals of concern and the measures to manage them'. Submitted a text proposal with Switzerland on chemicals of concerns.

## Australia

Advocated for a two-list approach to tackle high-risk products: i) products that can be managed nationally and ii) products that require global attention. Suggested the criteria be moved to an annex. Introduced provisions on party and non-party import/export of plastic products listed on the National Measures list or the Global Measures list and communication through a public register shared by the secretariat

# ARTICLE 5 PLASTIC PRODUCT DESIGN

Article 5 introduces a vital dimension of the treaty by focusing on plastic product design, which is instrumental to achieving a circular economy and minimizing environmental leakage. Despite the recognition of its importance, the current formulation of the article remains misaligned with ambition. While it outlines obligations for Parties to enhance product design, it lacks clarity on minimum global criteria or harmonized performance requirements. This omission risks undermining the ability of the treaty to drive systemic transformation, especially in global supply chains where product design decisions are often centralized and transboundary in impact.

The overall sentiment among states reflects a relatively convergent view that product design obligations should be binding. Countries including the EU, UK, Philippines, Indonesia and USA have clearly endorsed legally binding measures, with suggestions for the Conference of the Parties (COP) to develop global design standards through a structured, sectoral approach. These proposals aim to establish predictable frameworks that can support upstream innovation and downstream waste management systems.

On the other hand, a smaller group of countries such as Saudi Arabia, India and Brazil have advocated for a voluntary approach, citing national circumstances, existing standards and the role of domestic regulatory agencies. While national flexibility is important, it should not come at the cost of undermining coherence or allowing the continued proliferation of poorly designed products that are difficult to recycle or manage post-consumption.


Countries like China and Türkiye have attempted to strike a balance by supporting binding language while referencing national priorities and capabilities. Meanwhile, the African Group has emphasized the need for harmonized design standards and criteria applicable across sectors, further reinforcing the call for a common global framework.

Moving forward, Parties will need to find common ground on the development of global design criteria, mechanisms for sector-specific implementation, and institutional mandates for the COP. Strengthening Article 5 in these areas will be critical for operationalizing product stewardship and enabling circular systems at scale.

# Article 5: Plastic product design

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS



**United Kingdom**  
Advocated for a legally binding approach. Proposed the future CoP to adopt a 'product design and performance requirements, following a sectoral approach'.

**Saudi Arabia**  
Opted for a voluntary approach. Proposed implementation through 'relevant standards organization'. Advocated for national-level 'application-specific certification procedures and labelling measures for plastics and plastic products'.

**United States of America**  
Replaced 'encouraged' with 'shall' advocating for legally binding measures. Removed the obligation on the future CoP to adopt guidance at its first meeting.

**Brazil**  
Advocated for a voluntary approach. Removed reference to sector based approach. Replaced 'reduce use of PPP' with 'reduce demand of PPP'.

**Ethiopia on behalf of AGN**  
Aligned with South Africa's intervention on behalf of the African Group. Used strong language such as 'harmonized design approach', and 'consistent design criteria across different products and sectors'.

**Egypt**  
Opted for a voluntary approach 'to promote enhanced design and performance of plastic products, taking into account relevant standards and guidelines, including sector- or product-specific national standards and guidelines'.

**Hungary on behalf of EU**  
Advocated for a legally binding approach. Suggested the CoP to 'establish a process and schedule of work for the development of specific design and performance requirements for priority products, through a sectoral approach'.

**Türkiye**  
Agreed to legally binding approach, 'to promote eco-design of plastic products based on national circumstances and capabilities with a life cycle approach'.

**Kazakhstan**  
Mentioned that primary plastic polymers are outside the scope of the future instrument and requested substitution of language on 'reduce the use of primary plastic polymers' with 'plastic products'.

**India**  
Advocated for a voluntary approach. Inserted language on 'national circumstances and capabilities'. Removed references to sector based approach, retaining product based approach.

**China**  
Advocated for a legally binding approach with 'consideration of national priorities and circumstances'. Inserted language on 'minimizing leakages from the after use of plastic products'. Stressed the inclusion of bio-based, biodegradable and compostable products in the alternatives.

**Iran**  
Advocated for a voluntary approach, based on national circumstances and capacity of each country.

**Qatar**  
Preferred no text for this article but exhibited flexibility to adopt proposal put forth by Russia. Suggested voluntary approach if the article is retained.

**Indonesia**  
Advocated for a legally binding approach. Did not mention keywords such as national/global guidelines, criteria or requirements.

**Philippines**  
Advocated for a legally binding approach. Inserted language on 'in accordance with minimum criteria-based global requirements'. Suggested developing countries be allowed time-bound exemptions for implementation.



# ARTICLE 6 SUPPLY

Within the framework of the global plastics treaty, Article 6 emerges as a potential tool to guide states toward more sustainable production systems. It seeks to enable collective goal-setting, information sharing and lifecycle-wide interventions, while leaving room for further refinement.

One of the article's central features is the proposal to establish an aspirational global target potentially outlined in an annex to help maintain or reduce plastic production to sustainable levels. It encourages parties to take measures throughout the plastic life cycle, including the reporting of statistical data on production, consumption, imports and exports. There is also a provision for a five-year review of progress made under this article, signalling an intention to build in accountability and course correction mechanisms over time.

Several states, including Rwanda on behalf of the African Group of Nations, along with PSIDS, Chile, Ethiopia, Kenya and others, have contributed proposals to expand the article's scope. These include systems for licensing the production and trade of primary plastic polymers, as well as common methodologies and guidance for reporting. Some countries have also emphasized links to broader concerns, such as human health, financial incentives, and the role of subsidies.

However, positions are far from uniform. Countries like Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have questioned the inclusion of this article altogether. Concerns range from its perceived incompatibility with the treaty's core agenda to fears that curbing production could interfere with global trade dynamics.

The trajectory of Article 6 reflects both the potential and complexity of addressing supply-side measures within a multilateral process. As the negotiations move forward, continued dialogue will be needed to define the role sustainable production can play in a treaty designed to end plastic pollution across its life cycle.

# Article 6: Supply [sustainable production]

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option



**Chile**  
Advocated that the article should 'mitigate the adverse impacts of the production of primary plastic polymers on human health and the environment'

**Panama**  
Made a proposal on behalf of 87 countries. Proposed that the COP at its first meeting adopt in an annex a global target to reduce the production of primary plastic polymers to sustainable levels. Also proposed that member states report statistical data on their production, imports and exports of primary plastic polymers. Mentioned that the states should adopt reporting format, timing, guidance and methodologies for implementation

**Ethiopia**  
Expressed full support for the statement presented by Rwanda

**Rwanda on behalf of 43 African nations**  
Advocated for measures across the life-cycle of plastic from product design to plastic waste management. Proposed for establishment and implementation of system for licensing the production, import and export of primary plastic polymers.

**Saudi Arabia**  
Requested the deletion of this article. Mentioned supply-side restrictions extend beyond the scope and do not solve the issue at hand

**Qatar**  
Supported Saudi Arabia's proposal. Mentioned that production is outside the mandate of the treaty. Added that 'supply constraints could disrupt global value chains, create economic instability'

**Kazakhstan**  
Recommended removing this article as it falls outside the mandate of the treaty

**Cook Islands on behalf of PSIDS**  
Proposed that the CoP at its first meeting adopt in an annex a global target to reduce the production of primary plastic polymers to sustainable levels. Also proposed that member states report statistical data on their production, imports and exports of primary plastic polymers. Mentioned that the states should adopt a reporting format, timing, guidance and methodologies for implementation

**Thailand**  
Advocated for a reduction in the oversupply of unnecessary plastic products, sustainable production and consumption levels, with data transparency

**Indonesia**  
Expressed concern that focusing largely on reduction in plastic production without a better substitute material may not be effective. Pitched for enhancing national capacities for solving the national waste problem.

**Kenya**  
Proposed for 'a baseline study on levels of production within their national jurisdictions to inform a reduction schedule set out in the annex for production'

**New Zealand**  
Requested that 'Parties should take measures to address the role of subsidies and fiscal incentives to plastic production that contribute to plastic pollution.' Referred to Articles 14 and 15 for the purpose of reporting

# ARTICLE 7 RELEASES AND LEAKAGES

Article 7 attempts to set the foundation for action against one of the most visible and pervasive dimensions of plastic pollution. While the text includes measures to prevent and reduce emissions and leakages such as from microplastics, fishing gear and plastic pellets, it remains bracketed in key sections and uses language that offers states considerable interpretive space. This has led to varied positions among countries on the strength and clarity of the obligations.

The Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), represented by Tuvalu, along with Samoa on behalf of AOSIS, have emphasized the need for more ambitious commitments. They have called for the inclusion of ‘prevent’ as a core obligation, stronger definitions of ‘emissions’ and ‘releases’, and specific references to fishing and aquaculture gear. These proposals reflect the urgency faced by coastal and marine-dependent nations, which experience the brunt of marine plastic pollution. Uruguay, on behalf of GRULAC, reinforced these concerns by highlighting the socioeconomic vulnerability of artisanal and Indigenous fishing communities and the need for their protection in the treaty’s implementation.

In contrast, countries like China and Brazil have advocated for a softer framing. China supported replacing binding language such as ‘shall’ with ‘should’, and proposed the development of non-binding guidance by the COP. Brazil removed references to Annex B and sought flexibility to regulate emissions from recycling facilities domestically. Similarly, the US and others favoured general obligations rather than detailed mandates, emphasizing national discretion over uniformity.

While there is broad support for addressing leakages, especially into marine environments, the depth and specificity of commitments remain uneven.

# Article 7: Releases and leakages

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS

## United States of America

Stressed on the inclusion of fishing and aquaculture composed of plastic. Replaced 'shall' with 'should' and 'may' in the proposed paragraphs'

## Brazil

Suggested inclusion of recycling facilities as source of emission and releases. Disagreed to sectoral approach while emphasizing on 'type of plastic waste'. Removed references to list of plastic products (Annex B).

## Uruguay on behalf of GRULAC

Proposed life-cycle management and remediation of plastic fishing and aquaculture gear. Advocated for supporting artisanal, small scale, Indigenous and traditional fishers as well as communities that rely on fishing and aquaculture

## Kuwait

Advocated for voluntary language by replacing 'shall' with 'should', 'encourage'. Deleted references to chemicals of concern, primary plastics, microplastics and nanoplastics

## Türkiye

Advocated for voluntary and non-binding approach taking into consideration national circumstances and capabilities.

## Bangladesh

Added 'including transboundary waterways'. Inserted references to macroplastic and its disintegration during and after the use of plastic products.

## Iran

Requested considering national circumstances and capabilities, and national environmental regulations. Removed references to chemical of concern, plastic pellets, microplastics, and nanoplastics. Urged for the necessity of defining microplastic and nanoplastic

## Kazakhstan

Sought clarity on definitions of 'emissions' and 'releases'. Advocated that 'the Treaty should only reflect intentions to conduct scientific research on micro- and nanoparticles'

## China

Replaced 'shall' with 'should', indicating the voluntary nature of measures. Deleted 'eliminate'. Requested the CoP to 'develop guidance on assessing and identification on prioritized sources' at its first meeting

## Philippines

Added 'prevent' as a measure. Inserted language on 'full life cycle of plastics'. Requested CoP to 'adopt guidance on standardized data collection, monitoring, and reporting'

## Japan

Added 'assess' as a measure. Deleted chemicals of concern as used in plastic products from the list. Inserted 'assess sources and trends of emissions and releases'

## Tuvalu on behalf of PSIDS

Added 'prevent' to measures. Expanded the scope to include emissions across the entire plastic life cycle, explicitly targeting chemicals and polymers of concern, products containing plastics from all sources and fragments, thereof. Requested the CoP to adopt 'standards and guidelines' at its first meeting

## Republic of Korea

Added references to ALDFG

## Malaysia

Aligned with Saudi Arabia. Questioned 'what is the difference between this article and Article 8 of waste management'

## Thailand

Added 'manage' as a measure to eliminate emissions and releases. Requested addition of ALDFG to the existing list

## Indonesia

Sought clarity on definitions of 'emissions' and 'releases'. Emphasized on national circumstances and capabilities as well as relevant national regulation.

## Australia

Proposed a new paragraph that emphasized on 'information on the volume and types of emissions and releases of plastics and chemicals of concern as used in plastics'

## Samoa on behalf of AOSIS

Sought clarity on what is considered 'emissions' and 'releases'. Mentioned that types of measures being contemplated are unclear. Requested addition of plastic fishing and aquaculture gear



# ARTICLE 8 PLASTIC WASTE MANAGEMENT

Article 8 serves as a critical juncture in the treaty negotiations, addressing the management of plastic waste and laying the groundwork for national systems that can prevent environmental leakage while fostering equity. While the current text reflects moderate alignment with ambition particularly through the inclusion of waste hierarchy principles and the recognition of informal waste workers, differences remain on the level of binding obligation and the scope of action required from Parties. The article's varying use of 'shall' and 'should' continues to create ambiguity around enforceability.


Several country groupings and Parties have called for stronger commitments. The African Group, represented by Nigeria and AOSIS, led by Samoa, urged legally binding provisions and underscored the importance of capacity checks on plastic waste imports, disaster-resilient infrastructure and fair treatment of informal waste workers. Brazil and Mongolia supported a dedicated article on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), emphasizing producer accountability and infrastructure development. Norway introduced national target frameworks and envisioned a proactive role for the COP in guiding future action.

Divergences persist, particularly around the degree of global oversight and the balance between national discretion and international coordination. India and a group of Asian countries, including Iran, Malaysia and Brunei, advocated for national flexibility, removed export restrictions citing the Basel Convention and highlighted the need for financial and technical assistance. Meanwhile, Russia and others emphasized curbing waste exports from developed to developing nations. Despite these differences, there is growing recognition of the need for globally coherent EPR systems and meaningful integration of waste pickers into formal waste management key areas that could unite Parties in the next stage of negotiations.

# Article 8: Plastic waste management

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS / PSIDS



**Hungary on behalf of EU:**

Proposed that additional measures should be obligatory in nature. Removed references to mobilizing resources. Advocated for a standalone article on EPR.

**Norway**

Proposed that each party shall develop and implement a framework which includes national targets for reduced waste generation, collection, recycling. Broadened the future CoP's goal to adopt additional Annex, establish work programmes, and cooperate with appropriate bodies

**United Kingdom**

Supported submission made by EU. Deleted references to resource mobilization. Advocated for a standalone article on EPR

**Iran**

Removed references to legally binding language. Expressed concerns on overlaps with Basel Convention. Mentioned that EPR should be considered strictly at national level.

**Kuwait**

Aligned with Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. Requested for merging Articles on 'emissions and releases' and 'plastic waste management'

**India**

Added references to national circumstances, capabilities, and regulations. Advocated for financial and technical assistance. Deleted paragraphs related to export of plastic waste possibly due to its coverage under Basel Convention

**China**

Specified sectors such industrial, agricultural, and municipal solid waste. Included users as a stakeholder, and introduced phrases like 'taxes or fees paid by users'

**Russia**

Advocated for taking into account national circumstances and national laws. Deleted phrases like 'waste hierarchy' and 'throughout the value chain'. Suggested that 'developed parties shall prohibit export of plastic waste to developing parties, especially LDCs'

**Mongolia**

Proposed binding measures to 'hold producers accountable for the full lifecycle of plastic products'. Requested the CoP to adopt guidance on EPR schemes and recycling infrastructure development at its first meeting. Advocated for retention of phrase 'national circumstances and capabilities'

**Brunei**

Expressed concerns on overlaps with Basel Convention

**Philippines**

Inserted legally binding text to paragraph 2. Requested for consideration of safety and sustainability with regard to additional measures

**Türkiye**

Inserted references to national circumstances and capabilities. Proposed the use of secondary raw materials for plastic production.

**Cuba**

Deleted references to waste hierarchy. Disagreed to sectoral approaches.

**Burkina Faso**

Supported submission by African Group. Prioritized financial resources.

**Chile**

Advocated for a standalone article on EPR.

**Brazil**

Deleted references to sectoral approach. Stressed for the inclusion of 'just transition for waste pickers and other workers'. Supported a specific article that encourages parties to adopt EPR schemes at national level. Expressed concerns on overlaps with Basel Convention

**Nigeria on behalf of AGN**

Advocated for proof of capacity to manage imported plastic waste by parties. Mentioned that parties shall not allow waste management practices that lead to emissions and releases. Urged to prevent and eliminate illegal trade in plastic waste.

**Sri Lanka**

Proposed to maintain national inventory on plastic waste. Supported standalone article on EPR.

**Thailand**

Mentioned that plastic waste exports shall be treated as hazardous under the rules and definition of Basel Convention.

**Cambodia**

Requested 'a reference to the just transition of waste pickers and other workers in informal and cooperative settings'

**Malaysia**

Removed references to legally binding language. Expressed concerns on overlaps with Basel Convention.

**Indonesia**

Added terminologies such as preventing, minimizing, reusing, in addition to handling, sorting, etc. Advocated for a standalone article on EPR. Expressed concerns on overlaps with Basel Convention

**Australia**

Requested for a mandatory reporting obligation on volumes and types of plastic waste generated and recycled

**Vanuatu on behalf of PSIDS**  
Advocated for measures to be taken by parties to be obligatory in nature. Requested for special consideration to circumstances of PSIDS

**Samoa on behalf of AOSIS**

Advocated to retain the legally binding nature of this article and phrases like 'waste hierarchy'. Added that systems and infrastructure should be disaster resilient

**Japan**

Advocated for obligatory nature of additional measures. Included technologies like energy recovery

# ARTICLE 9 EXISTING PLASTIC POLLUTION


Article 9 addresses the pressing issue of existing plastic pollution often referred to as legacy plastic waste, yet the current draft remains tentative and fragmented in its ambition. It places a strong emphasis on individual Party action, overlooking the fact that plastic pollution, particularly in marine environments, is inherently transboundary. This omission has raised concerns among Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and coastal nations who face disproportionate impacts from plastic waste they did not generate. For them, a cooperative framework that facilitates joint monitoring, remediation and support is not only fair but essential to achieving tangible outcomes.

While the article references science-based monitoring, clean-up efforts and stakeholder participation, the language is largely voluntary. This weakens its capacity to drive coordinated global action. Countries like Samoa (for AOSIS) and Vanuatu (for PSIDS) have been vocal about embedding legal obligations and establishing financial mechanisms such as a remediation trust fund. The EU and Australia have emphasized data and monitoring, while others, including Bangladesh, Chile and Brazil, have called for integrating ecosystems and Indigenous engagement into the article's scope.

However, divergent views persist. Some states such as the United States and Türkiye have sought to dilute obligations, preferring voluntary approaches with minimal external oversight. Meanwhile, countries like China, South Africa and members of the Arab Group (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Iran) have emphasized the need for financial and technical support and a focus on historical responsibility. The variation in positions highlights a deeper divide on accountability and the treaty's ability to respond to existing harm. Without firmer commitments and clearer cooperative pathways, the article risks offering rhetorical recognition without the structural support needed to deliver meaningful remediation.

# Article 9: Existing plastic pollution

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option





# ARTICLE 10 JUST TRANSITION


Article 10 introduces Just Transition as a core element of treaty implementation, signalling a shift toward socially equitable environmental governance. The inclusion of a standalone article is significant, as it acknowledges the disproportionate impacts that treaty measures may have on informal workers, small businesses and marginalized communities. However, the strength of this inclusion is tempered by the use of non-binding language and the omission of detailed guidance that could anchor the article in operational reality. While the text recognizes the importance of aligning environmental goals with social protections, the absence of stronger commitments and defined mechanisms limits its transformative potential.

Divergences among countries reflect a broader tension between ambition and discretion. Developing-country blocs like GRULAC and the Arab Group advocate for robust support systems—financial, technical and institutional—to ensure the transition does not exacerbate existing inequalities. Countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka have emphasized international cooperation and the role of SMEs and waste workers in the transition, while others like Iran and Saudi Arabia focus on national capacity and public financing, often sidestepping informal sector concerns. The United States, meanwhile, has pushed for a flexible, nationally determined approach, resisting prescriptive or mandatory provisions.

These positions suggest that while Just Transition is a broadly accepted concept, its implementation remains contested. Without clearer obligations and a mechanism for COP to adopt binding guidance, the risk remains that the article will function more as a statement of intent than a driver of equitable change. Further negotiations will likely be required to bridge differences and solidify commitments.

# Article 10: Just transition

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option



# ARTICLE 11 FINANCING

Article 11, which addresses the means of implementation (MOI), remains one of the more complex and unresolved areas in the treaty text. Most of the language remains bracketed, reflecting deep divisions among states.

The primary divergence lies in the question of the financial mechanism. While some countries advocate for a new standalone fund to support treaty implementation, others prefer leveraging existing funding structures.

A large coalition of developing countries, including the African Group, AOSIS, GRULAC and others, have strongly advocated for a dedicated, independent multilateral fund. This proposed mechanism would ensure that developed countries bear primary responsibility for financing treaty implementation, reflecting long-standing environmental justice concerns. Many parties, including India, Indonesia and Malaysia, underscored the importance of new and additional funds, distinct from existing climate and environmental finance, to avoid dilution of resources and ensure clarity of purpose.

Some countries, such as Samoa, have proposed a hybrid model that combines existing structures like the Global Environment Facility (GEF) with new funding streams, including a potential Remediation Fund.

There is also growing interest in innovative financing tools, such as Ghana's proposal for a polymer fee levied at the production level. On the other hand, the United States, leading a bloc of developed countries including the EU, Australia and Japan, has taken a more flexible and decentralized approach. Their proposal includes a mix of national budgets, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) schemes, private sector contributions, and voluntary international commitments, channelled through existing mechanisms like the GEF Trust Fund.

Concerns over fairness and enforceability persist. While several countries, including Iran and Kazakhstan, emphasize that developed countries should lead on public financing, they resist binding contributions. Others, such as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, also stress the need for predictability and accountability, but diverge on whether private-sector involvement should be mandatory or supplementary.

# Article 11: Financial resources and mechanism

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS / PSIDS

## United States of America

Made a submission on behalf of Australia, Canada, EU, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and UK: Proposed 'each party undertakes to provide resources'. Proposed a financial mechanism composed of the global environment facility trust fund.

## Egypt

Proposed 'The mechanism shall consist of a newly established dedicated and independent multilateral fund financed by contributions from non-developing country Parties on the basis of a the United Nations scale of assessment.'

## Switzerland

Joint submission with USA

## Norway

Joint submission with USA

## Iceland

Joint submission with USA

## United Kingdom

Joint submission with USA

## European Union

Joint submission with USA

## Kuwait

Mentioned private sector cannot be held accountable

## African group of Nation

Suggested 'developed country Parties shall take the lead on providing financial resources to support developing country Parties and Parties with economies in transition'. Requested new and additional financial resources. Suggested contributions from other parties on a voluntary basis.

## Türkiye

Aligned with African group submission on financial mechanism. Advocated for a mechanism that is comprehensive, transparent, and effective, with a particular emphasis on support for all developing countries. Requested mobilization of 'public, private, and blended financial resources'

## Iran

Proposed 'The responsibility of providing adequate and predictable financial resources through public funding to the fund remains with developed countries and other countries including developing countries may consider contributing to the fund in a voluntary manner.'

## Mongolia

Requested that 'financial mechanism's core obligations such as funding designation, types of funding, and stakeholder roles should be explicitly outlined'. Requested for a dedicated fund and a results based approach to ensure accountability and efficiency.

## Malaysia

Supported proposal by the African group. Requested for a new dedicated multilateral fund (MLF) and interim fund pending operationalization of the new MLF. Suggested that "the developed countries must continue to support the developing countries with financial assistance, capacity building and technical assistance as well as technological transfer through the financial mechanism."

## Philippines

Aligned with AFRICA group, GRULAC, and other delegations that urge the establishment of a dedicated multilateral fund outside of the GEF. Also supported Samoa's proposals on several funds. Mentioned developed countries parties should take a lead in providing financing. Urged flow of funds from both public and private sectors.

## Kazakhstan

Opposed the establishment of a mandatory contribution-based special fund for developing countries. Advocated 'for developed countries to take a leading role in supporting developing countries and economies in transition'

## Georgia

## Thailand

Aligned with proposal made by India/Africa Group, GRULAC, Cook Islands, Fiji and Federated States of Micronesia

## Japan

Joint submission with USA

## Indonesia

Advocated for a new and additional financial resources. Mentioned each party to contribute with resources.

## Sri Lanka

Proposed additional text for remediation of accidental spillage caused by maritime disasters

## Saudi Arabia

Proposed 'Developed country Parties shall provide new financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties.'

## India

Requested a new dedicated multilateral fund whose contributions shall be additional and distinct. Suggested funds to flow from developed countries to developing countries.

## Brunei

Advocated for a dedicated new fund. Welcomed the idea of an interim fund being sourced from existing funds.

## Australia

Joint submission with USA

## New Zealand

Joint submission with USA

## Samoa on behalf of AOSIS

Suggested 'consideration for a hybrid model which allows for funds out the door—this model could include the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund, establishing a new dedicated fund and a Remediation Fund'

## Ghana

Introduced the plastic polymer fee. Proposed the text 'Each Party with production of primary plastic polymers within its jurisdiction shall ensure, based on its national law and regulations, the collection of a fee from its producers, except developing country Parties with production below a *de minimis* level'

## GRULAC

Joint submission with African group, Cook Islands, Fiji and Federated States of Micronesia.



# ARTICLE 12 CAPACITY BUILDING, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Developing countries and negotiating blocs—such as AOSIS, GRULAC and several individual parties including Indonesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia—have emphasized that meaningful participation in treaty implementation hinges on timely, need-based and appropriate support. These countries advocate for clear obligations on developed states to provide not only financial but also technical and technological resources.

Proposals range from the establishment of cooperation mechanisms to the inclusion of legal provisions mandating technology sharing under fair and preferential terms. In particular, Saudi Arabia has called for strong legal commitments, including waivers on intellectual property rights for environmentally sound technologies.

China, Iran and Indonesia also insisted that capacity building must be the responsibility of developed countries and should include access to advanced technologies throughout the plastic lifecycle. These positions reflect longstanding concerns about asymmetries in global technological access and the risk of inequitable implementation.


By contrast, developed countries led by Australia, and echoed by Canada, the United States, Japan and others, prefer voluntary and flexible cooperation, focused primarily on supporting ‘parties most in need’. This group advocates for promoting collaboration but resists binding obligations, citing the importance of efficiency, shared responsibility and preserving innovation incentives.

Kazakhstan suggested the establishment of national centres to localize capacity building, while Malaysia emphasized that support should be country-driven, inclusive and iterative, reflecting a process-based rather than prescriptive model.

# Article 12: Capacity building, technical assistance and technology transfer, including international cooperation

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS



# ARTICLE 13 IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

Article 13 of the draft Global Plastics Treaty addresses the establishment of a compliance and implementation mechanism, which has emerged as a point of both convergence and contention among member states. The proposed mechanism includes the formation of a committee tasked with supporting implementation and promoting adherence to treaty obligations. Most countries support the idea in principle, but differ significantly on the structure, function and level of authority of such a body.

A broad group of countries, including members of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the European Union, have expressed support for a transparent, inclusive and facilitative committee. Their positions reflect an ambition for a strong implementation system rooted in equity and accountability. They have proposed specific features such as permanent representation for SIDS, gender balance in committee membership and clarity on decision-making rules. These positions highlight a desire for a mechanism that reflects the treaty's global scope and ensures fair representation of vulnerable regions.

At the same time, several countries—including China, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Türkiye and the Philippines—advocate for a softer, non-punitive approach. They emphasize the need to respect national capacities and support implementation through dialogue and cooperation rather than enforcement. Their positions suggest a preference for voluntary compliance mechanisms that avoid any perception of external imposition.


Some states, notably Iran, have expressed fundamental opposition to the concept of a compliance mechanism as currently framed. Their suggestions lean toward a cooperative body that avoids any accountability provisions, raising questions about the scope and effectiveness of such a structure.

Despite these differences, there is general agreement that the modalities and procedures of the committee can be refined and adopted later by the Conference of Parties (COP). The inclusion or exclusion of terms such as 'review' and the clarity of procedural rules will likely shape the final form of Article 13 and influence the treaty's ability to drive meaningful implementation.

# Article 13: Implementation and compliance

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS / PSIDS





# ARTICLE 14 NATIONAL PLANS

Article 14 of the draft plastics treaty focuses on the formulation and implementation of national plans to guide country-level action. These plans are intended to operationalize the treaty's objectives within national contexts, serving as roadmaps for coordination across government sectors, stakeholders, and regional partners. While the concept of national planning received broad acknowledgment, the level of obligation and prescriptiveness around these plans remains a point of contention among states.


Several countries and groups—including Samoa on behalf of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), the Philippines, Rwanda, and Hungary—emphasized the need for national plans to be mandatory, time-bound, and aligned with broader treaty reporting and monitoring efforts. Their proposals call for structured national planning frameworks supported by guidance from the Conference of Parties (COP), especially for developing countries requiring financial and technical assistance.

Others, such as Ghana and Japan, supported the Chair's draft but sought clarity on the degree of ambition and accountability embedded in these plans. Australia also expressed support but recommended softening some of the terminology. Meanwhile, countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, China, Malaysia and the United States proposed changes that would reduce the binding nature of Article 14. These included calls to shift obligations into more discretionary language, broaden the scope for national flexibility, and in some cases, bracket the entire article. Kuwait explicitly questioned the value of making such planning mandatory under the treaty framework.

Overall, while there is consensus on the value of national planning as a tool for domestic coordination and treaty implementation, there remains divergence on whether it should be a binding requirement. The outcome of this discussion will shape the treaty's enforceability and determine how uniformly countries translate global commitments into national action.

# Article 14: National plans

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option



# ARTICLE 15 REPORTING

Article 15 outlines how Parties to the plastics treaty will report their efforts to implement the agreement. These reporting requirements are central to enabling transparency, fostering accountability, and informing future evaluations of the treaty's overall effectiveness. The current draft proposes that countries submit periodic reports, with the Conference of the Parties (COP) responsible for determining the format, timeline, and content of such reports.

While many countries supported the general intent of the article, they diverged on how binding and detailed the obligations should be. Countries like Malawi and Ghana, representing the African Group, supported the Chair's text and advocated for enhanced reporting structures, including specific, measurable indicators. They emphasized the importance of aligning national reports with other substantive articles of the treaty. Similarly, countries such as Samoa (on behalf of SIDS) and the Philippines favoured mandatory reporting, while calling for flexibility and capacity-building support for low-resource nations.

The United States expressed support for reporting requirements tied explicitly to treaty obligations and highlighted the need for early adoption of reporting modalities by the COP. China and Türkiye also favoured universal reporting, though with varying degrees of flexibility for developing countries.


However, some countries were more cautious. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia proposed reducing reporting obligations for developing nations, citing administrative and capacity burdens. Kazakhstan took a more critical view, suggesting that all reporting provisions should be voluntary for developing countries.

Despite these differences, there is general recognition that reporting will be vital to track the treaty's implementation.

# Article 15: Reporting

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS / PSIDS





# ARTICLE 16 EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION

Article 16 sets the foundation for assessing how well the treaty achieves its objectives over time. It provides a framework for periodic evaluations led by the Conference of the Parties (COP), using scientific, technical and policy-relevant data. While the current draft is broadly aligned with the aim of building an ambitious and responsive treaty, country submissions indicate varying levels of engagement with the scope, timeline and mechanisms of such evaluations.

Several countries and regional blocs see the effectiveness evaluation as a critical tool for continuous improvement. The African Group, represented by Malawi and Ghana, has emphasized the need for evidence-based assessments, calling for the establishment of baseline data and harmonized methodologies to track plastic flows and environmental impacts. Bangladesh and Hungary echoed this approach, proposing shorter evaluation timelines and integrated monitoring tools to generate actionable insights.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS), including Samoa and the Philippines, advocated for expanding the evaluation scope beyond technical indicators to include traditional knowledge, socioeconomic factors, and the unique vulnerabilities of frontline communities. These countries also supported the creation of a science-policy interface to guide decision-making. Norway and Indonesia reinforced the need for inclusive metrics, with Norway highlighting the potential role of corporate lifecycle reporting, and Indonesia recommending attention to social impacts.


Other countries, such as the United States and Kazakhstan, supported the current structure but proposed moderate changes, including adjusted timelines and information-sharing mechanisms. By contrast, Saudi Arabia proposed a more restrained role for evaluation, favouring terminology such as ‘review’ rather than ‘monitoring’ and expressing concern about turning the process into a compliance tool.

Despite these differences, most parties recognize the value of systematic evaluation. The key challenge moving forward will be to design a process that is rigorous, inclusive and flexible—capable of generating credible insights while accommodating the diverse circumstances of participating countries.

# Article 16: Effectiveness evaluation

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS / PSIDS



# ARTICLE 17 INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Information exchange is a foundational pillar in the architecture of multilateral environmental agreements, and Article 17 reflects its centrality in the global effort to address plastic pollution. The provision outlines the mechanisms for sharing data, knowledge and best practices among Parties, with the goal of enhancing transparency, scientific collaboration and evidence-based decision-making. While there is broad support for the principle of information exchange, divergences persist on the operational details—particularly regarding the designation of national focal points, the role of the Secretariat and the treatment of confidential information.

Many countries have advocated for a robust and inclusive information-sharing framework. Members of the African Group, along with PSIDS and the United States, emphasized that health and environmental data should not be treated as confidential. Their proposals suggest a commitment to public access, especially when information has implications for human safety or ecological risk. PSIDS further called for the scientific and technical body to guide this process, while Norway introduced language encouraging corporate disclosure on plastic-related risks, in line with recent developments in biodiversity and sustainability governance.

Some submissions sought to strengthen the article’s implementation by linking it with national reporting and data tracking. Sri Lanka, for instance, proposed better alignment with Article 15 to ensure that national-level data collection supports both domestic planning and global evaluation efforts.


Conversely, a few delegations raised concerns about the breadth and enforceability of the proposed text. Saudi Arabia and Iran pushed for significant limitations, with proposals to exempt developing countries from certain information-sharing obligations or allow countries to withhold data on the grounds of national security. Türkiye supported the overall objective but suggested technical edits, such as distinct focal points for information and waste management.

Overall, Article 17 enjoys general support in principle. The challenge will be to ensure that information exchange is both functional and inclusive, enabling Parties to act on shared knowledge without undermining sovereignty or operational feasibility.

# Article 17: Information exchange

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS / PSIDS



**Norway**

Suggested additions with reference to KMGBF. Proposed a new paragraph encouraging Parties to require corporate disclosure of plastic-related impacts, risks, and dependencies, especially from large businesses and financial institutions

**Iran**

Disagreed to information exchange on sustainable production and consumption. Added 'Nothing in this Convention shall oblige any party to report, exchange or disclose data and information which it might consider to be against its national security, laws and regulations'

**PSIDS**

Inserted 'in accordance with guidance recommended by the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, Socioeconomic, and Cultural Advice and adopted by the COP'. Suggested that information on health and safety of humans and the environment shall not be regarded as confidential

**United States of America**

Added 'information on the health and safety of humans and the environment shall not be regarded as confidential'

**Saudi Arabia**

Proposed limiting obligations only to developed countries. Disagreed to information exchange on sustainable production and consumptions.

**Türkiye**

**Submission by Malawi, Ghana on behalf of AGN**

Added 'For the purposes of this Convention, information on health and safety of humans and the environment shall not be regarded as confidential'

**Sri Lanka**

Proposed linking Article 17 with reporting under Article 15. Added 'Best practices and research and technologies relevant to the collection, compilation and organisation of data on plastics flows'



# ARTICLE 18 PUBLIC INFORMATION, AWARENESS, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

Article 18 addresses the importance of fostering public understanding, stakeholder engagement and scientific progress to support the effective implementation of the plastic treaty. It recognizes that tackling plastic pollution extends beyond policy and infrastructure—it also requires informed societies, robust education systems and sustained investments in research and innovation.

Broadly, states support the inclusion of provisions on awareness and research, though they differ in how far-reaching and binding these commitments should be. Several countries, including the United States, proposed mechanisms to institutionalize scientific input into the treaty process. Their recommendation for an independent science body—distinct from state, industry or NGO affiliations—signals a push for evidence-based decision-making grounded in neutrality and transparency. Others, like Sri Lanka, stressed the value of publishing regular data on plastic flows to enhance public access to information and build trust.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS), including Pacific Island countries and Fiji, emphasized the need for context-sensitive education and outreach, especially for vulnerable groups. Their proposals also encouraged separating research and innovation into a standalone focus, reflecting its strategic importance in developing system-wide solutions and sustainable alternatives.

Thailand and others advocated for expanding the scope of public education and scientific research to reflect the full life cycle of plastics, from production to waste. This shift aims to support systemic change rather than reactive responses. Similarly, language around sustainable consumption, circular economy approaches, and socioeconomic dimensions of plastic use gained traction among a group of like-minded states.


However, some divergence remains. Saudi Arabia and a few other countries sought to soften the language of the article, replacing prescriptive terms with voluntary ones and narrowing the breadth of obligations. These proposals suggest a preference for flexibility over standardized global mandates, reflecting concerns about administrative burden or national sovereignty.

While most states agree on the value of awareness and research, differences persist over how directive these measures should be.

# Article 18: Awareness, education and research

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS



# ARTICLE 19 HEALTH

Article 19 addresses one of the most complex and politically sensitive elements of the global plastics treaty—how to acknowledge and act upon the health-related impacts of plastic pollution. Two main approaches have emerged: either embedding health-related language across relevant treaty articles or developing a standalone article that explicitly outlines obligations and cooperative actions related to human health.

There is broad recognition among states that plastic pollution presents risks to human health, particularly through exposure to hazardous chemicals, occupational exposure in the waste sector, and pollution of air, water and food chains. However, this shared understanding diverges significantly when it comes to the structure, legal framing and institutional linkages of a health-related article.

Several countries and groups, including the African Group, Guinea Bissau and the PSIDS, have advocated for a more ambitious and binding article that recognizes health impacts across the plastic life cycle. These submissions often emphasize the need to protect vulnerable groups—such as waste workers and frontline communities—and call for coordination with global health institutions, including WHO and ILO. Some have also sought alignment with broader frameworks like One Health, linking human, animal, and environmental well-being.

Other submissions, such as those from Brazil and Fiji, reinforce this ambition with concrete proposals around chemicals of concern, occupational safety, and inclusive health governance. These perspectives see the treaty as a platform to not only mitigate environmental impacts but also deliver co-benefits for public health.


In contrast, several member states—including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland—prefer a softer approach, focused on voluntary cooperation, capacity-building and research. These countries support integrating health concerns into the treaty but stop short of endorsing strong legal obligations. Saudi Arabia has gone further, questioning the relevance of a health article within this treaty and advocating for its removal entirely, citing jurisdictional concerns.

The ongoing discussion reflects a fundamental question in the negotiations: should the treaty proactively tackle health risks from plastics or defer to existing health frameworks?

# Article 19: Health

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS





# ARTICLE 20 CONFERENCE OF PARTIES

Article 20 establishes the Conference of the Parties (COP) as the central governing body of the global plastics treaty. As the institutional anchor of the agreement, the COP is tasked with reviewing implementation, adopting rules and protocols, guiding subsidiary bodies, and facilitating international coordination. While there is broad agreement on the COP's necessity, the negotiations reflect differing views on how expansive its authority should be and how decisions should be made.

Many countries have proposed enhancing the COP's capacity through the creation of dedicated subsidiary bodies. Several submissions—including from PSIDS, GRULAC and Uruguay—have called for scientific and technical bodies to be operational from the first COP. These bodies are envisioned to bring thematic, evidence-based support to the treaty's implementation, with recommendations including specialized panels, inclusive membership, and formal reporting lines to the COP. Such mechanisms are seen as vital for ensuring the treaty evolves in step with emerging science and policy needs.

Decision-making modalities remain a contentious issue. A number of states, including the Philippines, Rwanda and Norway, have supported the introduction of fallback voting mechanisms—such as a two-thirds majority—when consensus cannot be reached. This reflects a broader concern that overly rigid consensus requirements could stall the treaty's progress or prevent timely responses to urgent plastic pollution challenges. Others have gone further by suggesting that procedural decisions, such as the adoption of rules, should not be contingent on unanimous agreement.


In contrast, some countries have shown hesitation toward expanding the COP's mandate. The United States and Saudi Arabia, for instance, have proposed limiting the COP's authority to adopt new annexes or act on implementation data. Iran has opposed a compliance-driven vision of the COP, advocating instead for a facilitative model grounded in national discretion.

The structure and powers of the COP remain a key site of negotiation, with implications for the treaty's adaptability, responsiveness, and long-term legitimacy. How states reconcile flexibility with accountability will define the strength and relevance of this core institution over time.

# Article 20: Conference of the Parties

- No in-session submission
- Proposed ambitious additions
- Proposed lower ambitions
- Accept measures as it is
- Don't want this option

AOSIS/PSIDS



# What happened at INC-5?

The fifth session of the INC was marked by limited transparency, as many observers were excluded from key contact group discussions due to logistical constraints, including under-capacitated meeting rooms and the mounting urgency to deliver a consolidated text for legal drafting. Despite these challenges, the determination of both the High Ambition Coalition and the like-minded countries was clearly demonstrated. Their active engagement throughout the negotiations reaffirmed that the majority of member states are committed to securing an ambitious, comprehensive treaty. It is increasingly evident that only a small group of countries continues to impede meaningful progress in the negotiations.

During the fifth meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), three key proposals addressing contentious issues garnered significant support from a wide range of countries:

- The Mexico Statement on Global Bans
- The Rwanda Statement: Stand Up for Ambition
- The Panama and PSIDS Submission on Primary Plastic Polymers (PPP)

Each of these statements reflected a growing momentum toward a high-ambition treaty. The number of countries endorsing each proposal is as follows:

Statement	Support received from (# member states)
Mexico Statement on Global Bans	95
Rwanda Statement on Stand Up for ambition	85
Panama and PSIDS statement on Primary Plastic Polymers (PPP)	104

While several countries maintained firm red lines on certain articles they preferred excluded from the future treaty, the overall trajectory of the negotiations showed progress compared to the last meeting in Ottawa. It also indicates that the process is nearing a critical mass of countries whose collective support could shift the balance, putting pressure on low-ambition countries that continue to prioritize short term economic interests over the well-being of the people they represent on the negotiation floor and the shared environment.

# What happened between INC-5 and INC-5.2?

Over the course of five rounds of negotiations of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), member states have had ample opportunity to articulate their red lines, identify points of convergence, and highlight areas of substantive divergence. These discussions have laid the groundwork for the adoption of an international legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution.

However, progress remains hindered by a persistent divide between oil and plastic-producing countries, many of which have pushed for a narrow focus on downstream waste management and a larger group of countries advocating for an ambitious, full life-cycle approach to plastic pollution.

The current Chair’s text reflects this tension. It presents a significantly diluted version of the treaty that was initially envisioned, shaped by the assertive positions and influence of fossil fuel-aligned states. As a result, several critical provisions, such as those related to plastic production limits, toxic chemical phase-outs, and financing mechanisms, remain heavily bracketed or intentionally ambiguous.

Since the fifth session, however, there has been renewed momentum. A number of countries have submitted formal textual proposals on key articles of the draft treaty. These proposals have emerged from active bilateral and multilateral consultations, signaling a growing appetite among member states to move the process forward in Geneva.

In early July 2025, member states convened in Nairobi for consultations aimed at identifying potential landing zones particularly for the more contentious articles of the draft treaty. Several of these articles saw the submission of fresh textual proposals by member states, reflecting evolving positions and efforts to bridge critical divides.

Article (# and title)	Member states taking the lead for bridging proposals
Article 3: Plastic products	Switzerland and Mexico
Article 5: Plastic product design	UK and Chile
Article 6: Supply	Japan
Article 7: Releases and leakages	UK and Panama
Article 15: Reporting	Bangladesh
Draft text (Alternative to the Chair’s Text)	Kuwait

Recognizing the significance of the resumed session in Geneva, the INC Secretariat, under the guidance of UNEP, has called for high-level political engagement, targeting Ministers. As of now, over 60 high level delegates from member states have confirmed their participation in what is being positioned as the anticipated final round of negotiations to establish a global treaty to end plastic pollution. However, after a strong pushback from a lot of countries, UNEP has now declared that participation of Ministers would be voluntary.

On July 11, 2025, the Chair released the Scenario Note for the resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). The note clarified that, as this is a continuation of the previous session, the Rules of Procedure (RoPs) will not be reopened for discussion. Emphasizing the need for efficiency, the Chair urged member states to avoid general statements and focus directly on the substantive work at hand in Geneva. As in the previous session, negotiations will be organized into smaller contact groups, with no more than two groups meeting in parallel. This approach is intended to ensure meaningful participation from delegations with limited capacity and to support more productive and inclusive discussions.

Contact group	Articles to be discussed
Contact Group 1	Article 2: Definitions Article 3: Plastic products Article 4: Exemptions Article 5: Plastic product design Article 6: Supply [sustainable production] Scope
Contact Group 2	Article 7: Releases and leakages Article 8: Plastic waste management Article 9: Existing plastic pollution Article 10: Just transition
Contact Group 3	Article 11: Financial [resources and] mechanism Article 12: Capacity building, technical assistance and technology transfer, including international cooperation

Contact group	Articles to be discussed
Contact Group 4	Preamble Article 1: Objective Article 1bis: Principles and approaches Article 13: Implementation and compliance Article 14: National plans Article 15: Reporting Article 16: Effectiveness evaluation Article 17: Information exchange Article 18: Public information, awareness, education and research Article 19: Health Article 20: Conference of the Parties Article 20bis: Subsidiary bodies Article 21: Secretariat Article 22: Settlement of disputes Article 23: Amendments to the Convention Article 24: Adoption and amendment of annexes Article 25: Right to vote Article 26: Signature Article 27: Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession Article 28: Entry into force Article 29: Reservation Article 30: Withdrawal Article 31: Depositary Article 32: Authentic texts

## Possible outcomes of the final round of negotiations

The upcoming final round of negotiations represents a critical make-or-break moment for the global treaty to end plastic pollution. Member states are expected to come to Geneva more prepared and more determined than ever to secure their priorities. While nearly all countries continue to express support for an ‘ambitious treaty,’ it has become increasingly clear that ambition means different things to different countries.

For some, ambition entails global bans on problematic and avoidable plastics. For others, it is defined by higher recycling targets, ensuring equity and inclusion through the principle of ‘leaving no one behind’, or guaranteed access to technology and financial support. For yet another group, true ambition lies in tackling the root of the problem: unsustainable plastic production.

Despite being at the heart of the process, a clear, collective discussion on what constitutes an ambitious treaty has never truly taken place among member states. This absence of a shared understanding risks deepening divisions and undermining the very goals the treaty seeks to achieve.

A range of outcomes is possible in the upcoming final round of negotiations to develop a global treaty to end plastic pollution. While it is difficult to anticipate every possible scenario, the following represent some of the most likely outcomes that could emerge from the resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5.2) in Geneva.

### Potential outcome 1: Agreement on a text for the Legal Drafting Group

#### Likelihood: Low

Member states reach consensus on a treaty text, which is then forwarded to the legal drafting group. The level of ambition in this scenario would be reflected in the inclusion of critical provisions: such as articles addressing upstream supply-side measures, plastic product design, and criteria for identifying problematic and avoidable plastics. The text may also contain an initial list of plastic products slated for global bans or phase-outs. A strong and implementable treaty would be anchored in globally harmonized design standards for plastic products, along

with a financing mechanism enabling regulation across borders. The Conference of the Parties (COP) would be empowered to adopt future amendments, including updates to annexes, allowing the treaty to evolve in response to scientific, technological and policy developments.

### Potential outcome 2: Incomplete consensus, but a workable framework emerges

#### Likelihood: Moderate

In this scenario, member states are unable to fully resolve all outstanding issues on the substantive elements of the future instrument, but they agree on a workable, though partial, treaty text that is forwarded to the legal drafting group. This draft would form the foundation of the instrument, with several provisions either left bracketed or vaguely worded. The Conference of the Parties would be mandated to bridge these gaps over time, using its authority to develop implementing measures and strengthen the treaty post-adoption. The instrument would still be opened for ratification by member states, but its immediate effectiveness could be compromised by the unresolved areas, relying heavily on future CoP negotiations to deliver the ambition that remains missing from the original text.

### Potential outcome 3: No agreement reached—treaty process stalls

#### Likelihood: Moderate

In the worst-case scenario, member states fail to reach consensus on a workable treaty text during the resumed INC-5.2 session in Geneva. Key issues such as production controls, financial mechanisms, and the legal form of obligations remain deeply contested. Without an agreed text, the legal drafting process cannot commence, and the treaty timeline is significantly delayed. This outcome could fracture the negotiation process, weaken political momentum, and embolden actors resistant to global regulation of plastics. While informal consultations and technical work may continue, the process risks losing credibility, and future negotiations may shift toward voluntary or fragmented regional approaches instead of a unified global instrument.

### Potential outcome 4: Coalition of the willing—action outside the UNEP mandate

#### Likelihood: Moderate

Persistent deadlock within the INC process and the inability to secure a strong, binding global treaty, a group of countries in favour of an ambitious approach decides to act outside the UNEP mandate. This coalition moves to establish an independent plurilateral framework or agreement aimed at curbing plastic



pollution across the life cycle, including measures such as production limits, chemical restrictions, design standards and trade-related provisions.

This ‘coalition of the willing’ may draw inspiration from other environmental precedents, such as the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People or the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, and may coordinate through alternative diplomatic forums (e.g., WTO, regional trade blocs, or multilateral environmental agreements).

While such a move allows ambitious countries to move forward with concrete action, it also risks fragmenting the global governance of plastics, excluding lower-income or politically sidelined countries, and creating asymmetric regulatory regimes. It may also dilute the momentum and legitimacy of the formal UNEP-led treaty process.

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